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ALL MIXED UP ABOUT MIXED QUESTIONS*
Randall H. Warner**
I. INTRODUCTION
"Elusive abominations."' Among the countless opinions
that wrestle with so-called "mixed questions of law and fact,"
one from the Court of Claims best summed up the problem with
these two words. The Ninth Circuit was more direct, if less
poetic, when it said that mixed question jurisprudence "lacks
clarity and coherence."2 And as if to punctuate the point, Black's
Law Dictionary offers a definition that is perfectly clear and
perfectly circular: "A question depending for solution on
questions of both law and fact, but is really a question of either
law or fact to be decided by either judge or jury." 3
* © 2005 Randall H. Warner. All rights reserved.
** The author is an appellate lawyer with the Phoenix firm of Jones, Skelton & Hochuli,
PLC. He can be reached at RWamer@jshfirm.com.
1. S & E Contractors, Inc. v. US., 433 F.2d 1373, 1378 (Ct. Cl. 1970), rev'd, 406
U.S. 1 (1972).
2. U.S. v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 1984), abrogated on other
grounds by Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
3. Black's Law Dictionary 904 (5th ed. West 1979).
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"Mixed question" is, like "question of fact" and "question
of law," a label given to issues on appeal for purposes of
determining the standard of review. But unlike those well-
defined categories, "mixed" has become a sort of catch-all, an
amorphous box into which courts place any issue or
combination of issues that cannot neatly be labeled law or fact.4
Hence, the lack of clarity and coherence. The mix-up about
mixed questions exists because courts try to apply a single
"mixed question" standard of review to a variety of issues that
are analytically quite different from one another.
Some questions courts call "mixed" involve determining
whether a given set of facts falls within a known legal standard
or definition, an exercise often described as "law application."
5
Some involve judging a person's conduct by determining
whether it was "fair" or "reasonable." 6 Still other questions are
considered mixed because they consist of two or more different
issues jumbled together. 7 Courts have been unable to agree on a
single standard by which to review all mixed questions because
the term means too many different things. 8 The mixed question
label, while convenient, fails to advance the standard-of-review
ball very far.9
This article is an attempt to unmix the mixed questions and
discern a set of principles by which courts can consistently
categorize and review questions that are neither purely law nor
4. As one commentator notes, the mixed question label is a potential "cop out"
because "it can obscure the complexity of what occurs." Richard D. Friedman, Standards
of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact and Law, 86 Nw. L. Rev. 916, 922 (1992).
5. See infra at Section V(C). As discussed below, "law application" is an ambiguous
term that is not very helpful in discerning the proper standard of review. See infra at text
accompanying nn. 114-16.
6. See infra at Section V(B).
7. See infra at Section V(D).
8. See Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal
Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 So. Cal. L. Rev. 235, 238-47 (1991).
Lee discusses at great length the division in authority among federal courts regarding how
to treat mixed questions.
9. The category helps so little that one court expressed a preference for avoiding it
altogether: "We prefer to consider issues either as matters of fact or of law, avoiding the
unhelpful category of 'mixed questions of law and fact.' That phrase usually conceals the
existence of both a question of fact and a question of law and does not aid in identifying
the appropriate standard of appellate review." ASCAP v. Showtime/Movie Channel, Inc.,
912 F.2d 563, 569 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).
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purely fact.' 0 While others have recently argued that there is no
analytical distinction between the categories of law and fact," I
maintain that there are several distinct categories of judicial
issues, 12 each of which must be approached differently on
appeal. As to some of these categories, there is little controversy
about the standard of review. Others require more in-depth
analysis and, in some instances, a policy choice about which
judicial actor is best equipped to decide them. And when two or
more different issue-types are intermingled, they must be
distinguished and analyzed separately. Lumping them together
under the "mixed question" label, and then ascribing a standard
of review based solely on that label, is a recipe for confusion.
This can sometimes be a complex undertaking, certainly
more complex than calling "mixed" any issue or group of issues
that is neither purely legal nor purely factual. But if a little
complexity is the price of clarity and consistency, it is a price
worth paying.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THE LAW/FACT DISTINCTION
The whole reason for labeling a question "law," "fact," or
"mixed" is to determine the standard of review on appeal; thus,
any attempt to understand mixed questions must begin with
standard of review. Standard of review is best understood as a
principle of judicial management. It is about dividing
decisionmaking authority among different parts of the
judiciary. 13 For a variety of reasons, our system leaves some
decisions in the hands of juries, others with trial judges and still
others with appellate judges. Of course, appellate courts have
the last word on all issues. But the standard by which they
10. This article concerns only judicial decisions. It does not tackle the review of
administrative decisions, although its methodology may turn out to be useful in that area as
well.
11. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1769, 1800 (2003).
12. See infra at text accompanying nn. 48-117.
13. See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between
the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury
Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 993, 997 (1986) ("Scope of review,
therefore, is the principal means by which adjudicative decisional power and responsibility
are divided between the trial and appellate levels.").
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review each issue-the degree of deference they will give to
another decisionmaker's resolution-varies depending on the
nature of the issue.
The bedrock principle is that questions of fact are best
determined by a jury of lay people. There are several reasons for
this. First, juries are in the best position to discern the truth,
having heard testimony first-hand along with all the eye-
twitches, sweaty brows, pregnant pauses and other non-verbal
cues that accompany it. Juries also get to see the physical
evidence in person. All the appellate court gets is a cold
record.' 4 Accompanying these concerns is the notion that twelve
lay people are better qualified to determine whether their peers
are telling the truth than are legal professionals.15
There is also a deeply-rooted tradition holding that we are
entitled to have our conduct judged by peers. Note that this idea
has nothing to do with fact-finding or truth-determining. Even if
we could invent an error-proof lie detector test, we still would
use juries to judge things like whether a party exercised due care
or was reasonable in relying on a representation. When the jury
makes such a determination, it is not being asked to decide what
happened, though it may make that determination as well. It is
being asked to judge another person's conduct or decisions
according to community standards. We often call such
determinations "questions of fact," even though they involve a
much different mental exercise. 16
Next, there is a concern for managerial efficiency. Even if
we thought three-judge appellate panels were better equipped to
determine the truth than a trial judge or a jury, we might still
relegate that task to lower courts because there simply are not
enough appellate judges to go around. And if there were, why
would we even bother having a lower court? We could have just
one level of court that would decide all issues: law, fact, or
otherwise.
14. The advent of video trial records is undermining this assumption somewhat, though
the technology has far to go before the recording is anywhere near as good as being there.
15. Whether this is true as an empirical matter, I leave to others. Indeed, were the only
concern deciding who is telling the truth, we might well leave fact-finding to a specialized
group of psychologists trained for that purpose.
16. See infra Section IV(E).
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Primarily for these reasons, our system leaves fact-finding
and certain conduct-judging to juries. Those same decisions are
relegated to the trial judge in bench trials even though, of the
considerations discussed above, only efficiency and the ability
to see and hear evidence first-hand applies equally to juries and
trial judges. Those considerations are strong enough that
findings of fact are reviewed with deference regardless of
whether they were made by a trial judge or a jury.
In contrast to these factual matters are questions of law,
which appellate courts review without deference, or "de novo."
Questions of law involve the creation of rules or the
interpretation of existing rules (arguably an act of rule-creation
in itself). Appellate judges have the ultimate authority over these
issues for a number of reasons. For one, judges are more expert
in the law than juries, because knowing and understanding law
is what they are trained to do. Appellate judges presumably are
selected for their legal expertise, and deciding legal questions is
what they do all day. Appellate judges also review a wide range
of cases and so have the advantage of a broad perspective. And
in contrast to trial court judges, who make lots of decisions each
day, often without time for extended reflection, appellate courts
have a greater opportunity to research, analyze, discuss, and
debate important legal issues.
Standard of review is therefore the legal principle that
makes our tiered system of courts work. Those tasks that are
relegated to appellate judges are reviewed de novo. Tasks
relegated to juries and trial judges are reviewed deferentially,
meaning that an appellate court will override the decision only if
it is very, very wrong. Courts use various terms to describe a
deferential standard of review: clearly erroneous, manifest error,
unsupported by substantial evidence, abuse of discretion, to
name a few. In some instances, there are subtle differences
among these standards, but those differences are not material
here.
There is nothing inherent or immutable about the way our
system divides decisionmaking authority. The idea that judges
and juries should perform separate functions owes more to
bureaucratic principles than to moral or political philosophy. But
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pragmatic does not equal unprincipled. 17 Though our judicial
system divides decisionmaking authority for practical reasons, it
still must do so based on a set of rules that can be consistently
applied. 18 This is why mixed question jurisprudence can be so
maddening. The lack of clarity and consistency regarding mixed
questions leaves the impression that courts can choose whatever
standard of review they want depending on the outcome they
wish to achieve.' 
9
In a 2003 article, Allen and Pardo argue that the law/fact
distinction is a myth.20 They claim that there is no reasoned
analytical distinction between law and fact because legal issues
involve a factual determination of what the law is. 2 1 As should
be clear from Section IV below, I disagree with this proposition;
there are real differences among the various issues courts
confront, and these differences are consistent and discernable
enough that courts can formulate different standard of review
rules to govern different categories of issues.2 2  But the
disagreement may turn out not to matter much. Allen and Pardo
concede that there may be good practical reasons to maintain the
"legal fiction" of the law/fact distinction. 23 If that is what it takes
to derive a consistent set of rules to govern standard of review,
it's good enough for me.
17. Cf Allen & Pardo, supra n. 11, at 1778 (suggesting that the law/fact distinction
reflects pragmatic choices made "under the guise of principled analysis"). A set of rules
governing standard of review, which can be consistently applied in a manner such that like
cases are treated alike, is eminently practical. Put another way, we should seek a principled
way to determine standard of review precisely because failing to do so would result in
haphazard decisionmaking.
18. As Justice Frankfurter well put it, "This is a court of review, not a tribunal
unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to
considerations of individual expediency." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
19. See e.g. In re Computer Engr. Assocs., 337 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2003) (mixed
questions are reviewed "on a sliding scale.., depending on how fact dominated the
question"); Charter Commun., Inc. v. County of Santa Cruz, 304 F.3d 927, 930 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1140 (2004) (deciding to review mixed question de novo
because it was not "essentially factual").
20. Allen & Pardo, supra n. 11, at 1790-1806.
21. Id.
22. See infra at Section IV.
23. Allen & Pardo, supra n. 11, at 1807.
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III. THE PROBLEM OF MIXED QUESTIONS
Noting the "vexing nature of the distinction between
questions of fact and questions of law," the Supreme Court in
Pullman-Standard v. Swint2 4 found substantial disagreement
among circuit courts on whether mixed questions are reviewed
de novo or deferentially. 25 State courts have fared no better. One
can find cases from all over holding that mixed questions are
reviewed de novo, 26 and others holding that they are reviewed
deferentially. 27 A split in authority alone would be no cause for
alarm, for jurisdictions divide all the time on important legal
issues. But this is not a division based on jurisprudential
differences. We do not find significant philosophical differences
among jurisdictions about the division of labor between judge
and jury. There seems to be no rhyme or reason why some
courts claim mixed questions are reviewed de novo while others
claim they are reviewed deferentially.
Many courts have tried to resolve the mixed question
conundrum by holding that the standard by which they are
reviewed depends on whether they are "primarily" or
"essentially" factual or legal. For example: "We review mixed
questions of law and fact either under the clearly erroneous
standard or de novo, depending on whether the mixed question
is primarily factual or legal., 28 And similarly,
[i]f application of the rule of law to the facts requires an
inquiry that is "essentially factual,".., the district court's
24. 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
25. Id. at 289 n. 19; see also Lee, supra n. 8, at 238-47.
26. See e.g. Baker v. Clover, 864 P.2d 1069, 1069 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1993) ("Because
the issue presents a mixed question of fact and law, our review is de novo."); Littrice v.
State, 75 P.3d 292, 294 (Kan. App. 2003) ("The performance and prejudice prongs of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim are mixed questions of law and fact on appeal,
requiring de novo review."); State v. Marcum, 109 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tenn. 2003) ("The
standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact is de novo with no presumption of
correctness.").
27. See e.g. Deguio v. U.S., 920 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1990) ("We review questions of
fact and mixed questions of fact and law under the clearly erroneous standard."); Cerilli v.
Newport Offshore, Ltd., 612 A.2d 35, 39 (R.I. 1992) ("The determination by a trial justice
of mixed questions of law and fact is entitled to the same deference as his or her factual
findings."); Phillips v. Fox, 458 S.E.2d 327, 332 (W.Va. 1995) ("[W]e review the trial
court's findings of fact following a bench trial, including mixed fact/law findings, under
the clearly erroneous standard.").
28. Anderson v. Commr., 62 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 1995).
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determination should be classified as one of fact reviewable
under the clearly erroneous standard.
29
This approach implies that there is a continuum of issues
ranging from purely legal to purely factual, and all you have to
do is pinpoint your issue on the continuum to determine the right
standard of review. As one commentator described it: "[L]aw
and fact have a nodal quality; they are points of rest and relative
stability on a continuum of experience. 3 °
This approach is attractive in its simplicity, but there are
three problems with it. First, it is a fallacy that mixed questions
lie in the middle of a continuum with law and fact on either side.
Some questions are simply outside the continuum. For example,
in a negligence case involving stipulated historical facts-that
is, the parties agree about what happened, but disagree about
whether the defendant's conduct was reasonable-the jury's
reasonableness determination is neither factual nor legal. It is
not deciding what happened, since that is stipulated. And it is
not deciding rules that apply for all similarly situated people. It
is just deciding whether one person's conduct was reasonable in
a specific circumstance.
Similarly, a jury's decision to award $1 million in damages
for pain and suffering is neither fact nor law, nor anything in
between. It is a different kind of decision altogether, one in
which the jury is neither determining what happened (a question
of fact) nor fixing a generally applicable rule (a question of law),
but is prescribing the appropriate result in one specific case.3'
Second, what is it that makes a mixed question more
factual or legal? Is it the number of factual disputes that must be
resolved in order to also resolve the mixed question? Take, for
example, the question of whether an employee was acting within
the course and scope of his employment, the dispositive issue
for respondeat superior liability. Is it a question of law if only
one factual issue is in dispute (say, whether the road the
29. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202.
30. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 233
(1985); see also e.g. US. v. Stokley, 881 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1989) ("On mixed
questions of fact and law, there is no bright-line standard but rather a sliding scale
depending on the 'mix' of the mixed question."); State v. Waldrop, 7 S.W.3d 836, 838
(Tex. App. 3d Dist. 1999) (review of a mixed question is deferential if its resolution turns
on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor).
31. See infra at Section IV(G).
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defendant was driving on was on a work-related route)? It
cannot be that deciding whether review is de novo or
deferential-the single most important factor in determining
whether an appeal will succeed-simply requires adding up the
facts in dispute and determining whether legal or factual issues
predominate.
This suggests a third problem with this approach: It permits
the standard of review for an issue to change from case to case.
To use the example of negligence, under the primarily legal or
factual approach, negligence would be reviewed deferentially in
a slip and fall case in which the parties dispute whether there
was a crack in the sidewalk, but de novo in the same case if the
defendant concedes there was a crack but disputes that
reasonable care required him to warn of it. This makes no sense.
Though the standard of review can vary from issue to issue, it
ought to be the same for one issue from case to case.
The Supreme Court has in recent years employed what
might be termed a "policy" approach to mixed questions.32 "The
fact/law distinction," the Supreme Court wrote in Miller v.
Fenton, "at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter
of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is in a
better position than another to decide the issue in question." 33
In Ornelas, for example, the Court held that probable cause
and reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo. These issues,
the Court noted, are "commonsense, nontechnical conceptions"
dealing with the factual and practical considerations on which
reasonable people act.34 So characterized, probable cause looks a
lot like negligence, a classic jury question. Nonetheless, because
of the need to "unify precedent" and ensure consistent
application of a constitutional requirement, the Court held that
those issues must be reviewed de novo. 3
5
The policy approach make some sense because it allocates
decisionmaking authority over questions that are neither legal
nor factual using the same principles that underlie the law/fact
distinction. You just ask whether, as a matter of judicial policy,
32. See e.g. Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690 (1996); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104
(1985).
33. Miller, 474 U.S. at 114.
34. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695.
35. Id. at 697.
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that question should be allocated to the fact-finder or to the
court. This approach works well for issues that, like probable
cause or negligence, require the decision-maker to make
judgments about a person's conduct. But it only works if the
policy decision on standard of review is made on an issue-by-
issue basis. The policy approach provides no guidance or
predictability if, for example, the reviewing court could decide
whether the particular probable cause issue before it was better
suited for de novo or deferential review.
There are other kinds of "mixed" questions, however, for
which the policy approach does not work. The first of these
involves questions that are deemed mixed because they contain
multiple parts. Consider the following:
The trial court found Husband's income in 1994 was
$131,000.00. Husband claims the court erred in attributing
a one-time capital gain of $99,760.00 as part of his 1994
income. This issue presents mixed questions of fact and
law, and we will accept the trial court's findings of fact
unless clearly erroneous and draw our own legal
conclusions based on those facts.
36
This issue of whether the trial court properly determined
the husband's income is not mixed in the same sense that
probable cause or negligence is. It is more properly called
"compound" because that single dispositive issue contains sub-
issues, some of which are purely factual, others of which are
legal. To reach its determination of income, the trial court would
have to find that certain financial transactions took place at
certain times (e.g., husband received cash on November 1, paid
for services with a credit card on August 23, transferred
ownership of an asset on October 9, etc.). These matters are
purely factual. Then the court would have to make some
conclusions about the legal effect of each transaction (i.e., does
it give rise to or offset income?).
Proper review of this issue depends not on policy
considerations, but on appropriately parsing the sub-issues. The
standard of review for each sub-issue is already known: The
factual issues are reviewed deferentially and the legal issues are
reviewed de novo. So there is no need to employ policy
36. Muchesko v. Muchesko, 955 P.2d 21, 27-28 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 1997).
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considerations to determine an overarching standard of review
for this particular mix of sub-issues. The standard for reviewing
purely factual and purely legal issues should not differ simply
because they are joined.3
The policy approach also does not fit very well-or, rather,
does not completely fit-with another kind of "mixed question,"
one that involves applying facts to a legal standard. It is often
said that when the facts are undisputed and the only issue
involves applying those facts to the law, the question is
reviewed de novo.3 But this is not entirely true. There are many
questions of law application that are left to the jury and
reviewed deferentially.
For example, the question of whether an employee was
acting within the course and scope of his job involves applying a
set of facts to the legal standard for course and scope. This is
usually a determination the jury makes, sometimes by applying
undisputed facts to the legal standard, sometimes by finding
facts and then applying the facts found to the legal standard.' "
But in some cases, the real issue is not whether the facts of the
case bring it within an undisputed legal definition, but rather one
that involves defining the standard itself. That is a question of
law. While there are some policy considerations at work here-
at some point, a court determined that juries generally are best
equipped to decide whether an employee was acting within the
course and scope of her employment-there is a principle of
generality as well. Whether the standard of review is de novo or
deferential in large part depends on whether the court is being
asked to rule on a question of law concerning the meaning of
37. The issue becomes more difficult when the trial court has reached its ultimate
conclusion without separating the various sub-issues. Determining the standard of review
in such circumstances is discussed infra in Section V(D).
38. See e.g. U.S. v. Graef 31 F.3d 362, 363 (6th Cir. 1994) ("because the relevant facts
are not in dispute, we review the district court's application of the FSTA de novo"); Flynn
v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 345-46 (Minn. App. 2001) ("When, as in this
case, the material facts are not in dispute, we review de novo the district court's application
of the law.").
39. See e.g. Nichols v. U.S., 796 F.2d 361, 365 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Whether an
employee's conduct is within the course and scope of his employment is a question of
fact."); Burkett v. Welborn, 42 S.W.3d 282, 287 (Tex. App. 6th Dist. 2001) ("The question
of whether an employee was acting in the course and scope of employment when he was
injured is ordinarily a question of fact.").
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"course and scope," or whether the issue is simply whether the
facts of this case fall within already-established meaning.
All of this is an oversimplification, and we will return to
these issues later.40 For present purposes, the point is simply that
the policy approach advocated by the Supreme Court in Miller
and Ornelas works for some kinds of mixed questions but not
others. Later in this article, I advocate an approach to mixed
questions that both assimilates and adds to the policy
approach,4 1 but we are getting ahead of ourselves. Before we can
construct an approach to mixed questions, we need to know
what the building blocks are.
IV. SORTING OUT THE ISSUE-TYPES
A. What Is an Issue-Type?
Courts often divide the kinds of issues they confront into
two categories (law and fact), or three (law, fact, and mixed).42
There are, however, many more than three of what, for lack of a
better term, I will call "issue-types." Each of these issue-types
requires the decision-maker to undertake a somewhat different
mental exercise, and each implicates different considerations
when it comes to deciding what the standard of review should
be.
B. Questions of Law
Let us start with the most basic issue-type and the one we
lawyers are most adept at identifying: questions of law.
Questions of law involve the establishment, disestablishment,
modification, or interpretation of legal rules. Some easy
examples are:
40. See infra at Section V(C).
41. See infra at Section V.
42. Courts also sometimes refer to an additional category that includes questions of
judicial administration. See infra at Section IV(H).
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" What statute of limitations applies to a particular tort?
43
" Can a plaintiff who suffered no physical injury recover
future medical-monitoring expenses for negligent infliction
of emotional distress?
44
- Does a statute violate the Equal Protection Clause?
45
The legal rules that courts interpret come from many
sources: constitutions, statutes, administrative regulations, court
rules, and common law. Even contracts are often said to contain
"private law.'A6 Questions of law are always for judges to decide
and always reviewed de novo on appeal. But courts sometimes
confuse the label with its consequence when they refer to any
issue reviewed de novo as a "question of law." While all
questions of law are reviewed de novo, not all issues reviewed
de novo are true questions of law.
47
Cases often equate law interpretation with the application
of fact to law, and therefore conclude that law application is a
question of law.48 This is sometimes true, but not always. When
there are undisputed historical facts and the question is whether
a statute applies on those facts, the question may well involve
interpreting a term in the statute or deciding as a matter of law
whether the statute applies to certain recurring circumstances. In
these examples, law application is the same as law
interpretation. But law application may just involve taking an
established, undisputed legal standard and deciding whether the
undisputed facts of this case fall within the standard. This latter
43. See Mendez v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Indus. Co., 52 F.3d 799 (9th Cir.
1995).
44. See Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1999).
45. See Austin v. Berryman, 955 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1992).
46. See e.g. Barrera v. Ciolino, 636 So. 2d 218, 222 n. 15 (La. 1994) (referring to
contracts as "the private law of the parties"). Contracts present a unique thorny problem. In
one sense, they can be understood as private law, i.e., a set of agreed-upon rules governing
relations between two or more parties. But contract interpretation often involves
determining what the parties intended, which is a question of historical fact. The problem
of contract interpretation is discussed infra in Section VI(C).
47. See e.g. infra at Section V(B).
48. See e.g. LoPresti v. Terwilliger, 126 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1997).
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exercise does not involve law interpretation. It is something
different.
To illustrate, take McDermott International, Inc. v.
Wilander,49 which involved whether an injured worker on an
ocean vessel who was not involved in its navigation was a
"seaman" entitled to recover under the Jones Act. The Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff need not be involved in navigating to
be a seaman, as long as he was connected to a vessel in
navigation. 50 It noted that seaman status under the Jones Act is
generally a question of fact, but "[i]t is for the court to define the
statutory standard.",51 The issue in McDermott was therefore
clearly one of law: The Court was interpreting the meaning of
"seaman" under a statute. While the Court suggested it was
engaged in law application, it was only doing so in the sense that
every question of law interpretation requires applying the law to
the facts of the case at issue.
But what if the issue were not whether one must be
involved in navigation to be a seaman, but whether the plaintiff
was, in fact, "connected to a vessel in navigation"? That
question would involve applying two established terms-
"connected to" and "vessel in navigation"-to the specific facts
of a case. The question would be one for the jury, and this would
be true regardless of whether the underlying historical facts
(e.g., where the plaintiff worked, what tasks he performed, etc.)•52
were disputed. If they were undisputed, the jury would apply
those facts to the law. If they were disputed, the jury would
engage in a two-part exercise of finding the facts and then
applying the legal standard.53
McDermott illustrates that what we often call law
application can either involve rule interpretation, which is a pure
question of law, or a different exercise that may be better suited
49. 498 U.S. 337 (1991).
50. Id. at 353-55.
51. Id. at 356.
52. Id. at 355 (noting that "seaman status under the Jones Act is a question of fact for
the jury").
53. The jury might not even be conscious of the dual nature of its decision, and the jury
instructions might not even separate the pure fact-finding from the application of law to
fact. Because both questions are for the jury, and are therefore reviewed deferentially, there
is little need to separate them. Separation is essential, however, when the question of law
application is reviewed de novo. See infra at Section V(D).
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for the trier of fact.54 We will get to that exercise later. The
important point here is that a question is only a question of law
if it asks the court to make, revoke, interpret or change legal
rules in a manner that will apply to other cases.
Certain questions of statutory interpretation require the
court to discern what the legislature intended. This is in many
ways a fact-finding exercise because the court reviews
legislative text, legislative history, and a variety of other such
materials to determine what the legislature intended its
enactment to mean.56 But determining such questions of
legislative intent-which courts sometimes refer to as
"legislative fact"-is consideredPart of law interpretation and is
not treated as a question of fact.
C. Questions of Historical Fact
Pure questions of fact are also fairly easy to identify. They
are the who, what, when, where, and how of every legal dispute:
Did the blue car stop at the stop sign? Whose signature is on the
contract? What words did the speaker utter? Courts and
commentators call these "historical facts' 58 or "basic facts. 5 9
They are the predicate facts upon which every legal decision is
54. Because of this ambiguity, I argue later that the term "law application" is not very
helpful in determining the standard of review. See infra at text accompanying nn. 114-17.
55. That is not to say that courts only make legal rulings when they issue published
opinions. Even an unpublished opinion can decide questions of law if those questions are
of the kind that have general applicability.
56. See Allen & Pardo, supra n. 11, at 1792-93.
57. See e.g. Concerned Citizens of S. Ohio, Inc. v. Pine Creek Conservancy Dist., 429
U.S. 651, 657 (1977) (Rehnquist, Powell & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) ("the determination of
legislative facts does not necessarily implicate the same considerations as does the
determination of adjudicative facts"). Use of the term "legislative fact" in this sense can be
confusing, of course, because the Rules of Evidence use it in a different way. Fed. R. Evid.
201 advisory comm. nn. (referring to legislative facts in the context of judicial notice as
"those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the
formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a
legislative body") (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
58. See e.g. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 665 (1987), superseded by
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). See also Monaghan, supra n. 30, at 235 (discussing "fact
identification").
59. See e.g. Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir.
1981).
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ultimately based. Historical facts are almost always reviewed
deferentially.6 °
Things get more confusing when historical facts are not
separated from the conclusions and judgments all of us naturally
make based on the events we experience. For example, one who
witnessed a bar fight might say that one person brutally and
unnecessarily beat another. That seems factual enough, but it
contains an element of evaluation. The pure historical facts are
that one person hit the other twice with his fist and once with his
elbow, kicked him in the ribs, and boxed his ears. The evaluative
judgment is that such a beating was brutal and unnecessary.
It is not always easy or possible to separate historical facts
from the judgments that follow. We often remember our
judgments about what we witness more clearly than we do the
predicate facts. For example, we might remember that a car we
encountered on the way to work was driving in an unsafe
manner, but we might not recall exactly what the car was doing
that gave us that impression.
Sometimes it does not matter whether we analytically
separate the historical facts from the conclusions we draw or the
judgments we make. In negligence cases, for example, the jury
decides both what the defendant did and whether what she did
was reasonable. But sometimes it makes a difference. For
example, in malicious prosecution cases, the jury decides what
happened, and the judge determines whether those facts
amounted to probable cause. 6 1 When reviewing such cases,
appellate courts must distinguish between the historical facts and
the conclusions to be drawn from those facts.62
60. There are narrow circumstances in which the Supreme Court has held that findings
of historical fact that are dispositive of a constitutional issue are reviewed de novo, or at
least with a tempered degree of deference. See e.g. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (indicating that actual malice in defamation cases is reviewed de
novo).
61. See e.g. In re Est. of Shumway, 9 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Ariz. 2000) ("In malicious
prosecution and false imprisonment cases, whether probable cause existed in a particular
case is a question of law to be determined by the court after the factual basis is determined
by the trier of fact.").
62. We sometimes use the word "inference" to describe a conclusion drawn from
historical facts. I have avoided using this term, however, because it has another, more
specific meaning. As discussed infra in Section VI(A), "inference" is more properly used
to describe the reasoning that allows a jury to find historical facts based on circumstantial
evidence.
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Historical facts include not only hard, physical facts, but
also a person's subjective mental state.63 Whether a person
intended to strike another is a question of historical fact.
Whether a person acted with good faith is a question of
historical fact. What a person knew is a question of historical
fact. Because the only direct evidence of a person's mental state
is her own testimony, however, circumstantial evidence is
almost always necessary to prove such historical facts.
64
By contrast, objective mental states are not historical facts.
Deciding whether a person's knowledge or belief was
reasonable does not require the decision-maker to determine
what happened, but rather to make a judgment about that belief
according to unarticulated and often inarticulable community
standards. I refer to this kind of judgment call, which might be
made by judge or jury depending on the specific issue, as an
"evaluative determination." Evaluative determinations are
discussed more fully below.
65
D. Predictive Facts
Sometimes judges and juries are called upon to make
predictions. In a personal injury case, the jury might be asked to
predict what the plaintiffs future medical needs will be. 66 In a
contract case involving lost-profit damages, the jury might have
to predict what the plaintiffs business would have earned but
for the breach.67 The former example is a prediction of actual
fact: The jury is being asked to determine what is likely to occur
in the future. The latter is a hypothetical prediction of what
63. See Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 Cal.
L. Rev. 1867, 1870 (1966); see e.g. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc.,
164 F.3d 736, 748 (2d Cir. 1998) (indicating that whether parties intended memorandum to
be a contract is a question of fact); In re Kennedy, 108 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that intent to defraud is a question of fact); McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67
F.3d 917, 924 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (suggesting that whether a party acted in good faith is a
question of fact).
64. Weiner, supra n. 63, at 1870.
65. See infra at Section IV(E).
66. See e.g. O'Brien v. Thomas Steel Corp., 538 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (Ill. App. 3d Dist.
1989), overruled on other grounds, Voykin v. Est. of DeBoer, 733 N.E.2d 1275 (I11. 2000)
(characterizing such a prediction as a question of fact).
67. See e.g. State Off. Sys., Inc. v. Olivetti Corp. of Am., 762 F.2d 843, 846 (10th Cir.
1985) (approving lost-profits evidence as presented to jury).
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would have happened had the historical facts been different (i.e.,
the defendant did not breach). Though analytically different
from pure questions of historical fact, courts treat predictive
issues of both the actual and hypothetical varieties as questions
of fact.
68
But just because an issue. appears, by its verbal formulation,
to be a question of predictive fact does not mean that it is. In
trademark law, for example, "likelihood of confusion" is the
critical determination in an infringement claim. 69 On the surface,
that issue looks like a question of predictive fact: It asks the jury
to predict whether consumers are likely to be confused. For this
reason, some courts have considered likelihood of confusion a
question of pure fact.7 °
Other circuits call likelihood of confusion a mixed question
of law and fact, and among those, some say that it is a mixed
question reviewed de novo, 1 while others say that it is a mixed
question reviewed deferentially. 72 Under this view, likelihood of
confusion does not call for a true prediction of what will or
would happen. Rather it is a judgment call regarding whether
one mark so closely resembles another that it violates the
policies of trademark law. "Likelihood of confusion" is, under
that formulation, a shorthand expression for those policy
considerations.
68. E.g. Tarin v. County of Los Angeles, 123 F.3d 1259, 1267 (9th Cir. 1997),
superseded by statute, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq. (whether plaintiff would have been
promoted "but for" her military service is a question of fact); State Off. Sys., 762 F.2d at
846; O'Brien, 538 N.E.2d at 1166; see also Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415,
459 (1996) (referring to actual damages as presenting a question of historical or predictive
fact).
69. For a discussion about the proper standard of review for likelihood of confusion
determinations, see Patricia J. Kaeding, Clearly Erroneous Review of Mixed Questions of
Law and Fact: The Likelihood of Confusion Determination in Trademark Law, 59 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1291 (1992).
70. See e.g. Keds Corp. v. Renee Intl. Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 222 (1st Cir. 1989)
(noting application of clearly erroneous standard); Am. Home Prods. Corp v. Barr
Laboratories, Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370 (3d Cir. 1987) (same); see also Kaeding, supra n. 68,
at 1297-98.
71. See e.g. Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1991);
Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 715 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see
also Kaeding, supra n. 69, at 1299-1301.
72. See e.g. E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 955 F.2d 1327, 1338 (9th Cir.
1992), amended and superseded by 967 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Kaeding, supra
n. 69, at 1297.
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E. Evaluative Determinations
To this point, I have alluded to issues that require the
decision-maker to exercise judgment and evaluate a person's
conduct or a set of circumstances. The most common example is
reasonable care in a negligence case. While universally
considered a jury question and often labeled a uestion of fact, it
is utterly unlike a question of historical fact. The jury is not
being asked to determine what happened or what the defendant
did. It is being asked to determine whether the defendant's
conduct was reasonable or fell below the invisible line of due
care. 74 Of course, the jury may be asked to decide questions of
historical fact at the same time it determines whether the
defendant acted reasonably, and typically it would not even
separate out these very different intellectual exercises.
Two similar issues, which we have already discussed, are
probable cause and reasonable suspicion in Fourth Amendment
cases. 75 Like negligence, these questions ask the decision-maker
to judge a person's actions or decisions according to a
community standard.76 The standard for probable cause, for
example, is whether "the known facts and circumstances are
sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found., 77 But
despite their similarity to negligence, the Supreme Court has
held that probable cause and reasonable suspicion are reviewed
de novo, though it has emphasized that the underlying historical
facts are to be reviewed deferentially.
78
73. See Monaghan, supra n. 30, at 232 n. 22 ("In deciding questions of negligence, the
jury is called upon to exercise its judgment to formulate a more precise standard by which
to evaluate some particular act or omission. Strictly speaking, this task is neither
factfinding nor law declaration.").
74. See Friedman, supra n. 4, at 922:
Courts might speak of a standard such as "reasonable" as a question of fact. We
should not be fooled. The jury in such a case does more than determine an aspect
of reality. It also determines the norms that will be applied in that case. In a real
sense, it makes law-but inarticulate law that is good for one case only.
75. Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (holding that a determination of either
should be reviewed de novo).
76. Id. at 695 ("Articulating precisely what 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause'
mean is not possible.").
77. Id. at 696.
78. Id. at 699.
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This article uses the term "evaluative determination" for
issues that-like negligence, probable cause, and reasonable
suspicion-require a decision-maker to exercise judgment.
Evaluative determinations are found everywhere in the law.
Almost any time an issue uses words like "reasonable" or "fair,"
it calls for an evaluative determination.
For example, one issue in common-law fraud cases is
whether the plaintiff reasonably relied on the defendant's
misrepresentation. 79 This asks the jury to take a set of historical
facts concerning what the plaintiff knew (e.g., the defendant was
a known swindler or a used-car salesperson), and then judge the
plaintiffs decision to rely on the defendant's representation
according to a community standard of reasonableness. Note,
however, that reasonable reliance, which is an evaluative
determination, is different from actual reliance. Whether the
plaintiff actually made a decision to act in a certain way (e.g.,
buy the car) based on the defendant's misrepresentation is a
question of historical fact involving the plaintiff's mental state.
Other examples of evaluative determinations include
reasonable accommodation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, materiality in securities fraud cases s l
proximate causation in tort cases,8 2 fair use in copyright cases,8 3
84and comparative fault in tort cases.
One characteristic of an evaluative determination is that it
cannot be refined into a neat set of legal rules. It may be possible
to establish rules that apply to certain recurring circumstances;
for example, it is negligence per se to run a red light. But the
79. See e.g. In re Rovell, 194 F.3d 867, 870-71 (7th Cir. 1999).
80. See e.g. Wood v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 25 F.3d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 1994) (pointing out
that district court's conclusion regarding whether accommodations are reasonable is
reviewed de novo because it involves application of law to undisputed facts).
81. See e.g. leradi v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 230 F.3d 594, 599 (3d Cir. 2000)
(calling materiality a mixed question).
82. See e.g. Piper v. Bear Med Sys., Inc., 883 P.2d 407, 411 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 1994)
("[P]roximate cause is not merely a finding that there is a connection between defendant's
conduct and the injury. It is a legal determination that certain conduct is significant or
important enough that the defendant should be legally responsible.").
83. See e.g. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
84. See e.g. Williams v. Maritime, Inc., 889 So. 2d 1055, 1058 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2004),
writ denied, 896 So. 2d 72 (La. 2005) ("Like all factual findings the standard of review of
comparative fault allocations is that of manifest error.").
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infinite variety of circumstances make it necessary that
evaluative determinations be made on. a case-by-case basis.
When courts speak of mixed questions, they often are
referring to evaluative determinations. 85 But the term "mixed"
has a double meaning when used in this way. When a court calls
an evaluative determination "mixed," it may simply mean that
question does not fall neatly into the categories of law or fact.
Or it may be referring to the mixture of an evaluative
determination with a pure question of fact, such as when the jury
must determine what the defendant did, then whether what he
did was reasonable. The latter example, while some courts
would call it mixed, is more properly called a "compound
question" consisting of both a question of historical fact and an
evaluative determination.
F. Definition Application
Closely related to evaluative determinations are those
issues in which the decision-maker applies a set of historical
facts to a term or phrase with legal consequences. Take, for
example, the question of whether a suspect was "in custody" so
as to be entitled to Miranda warnings.86 Case law has
established what it means to be "in custody." While there may
be cases in which the definition of "in custody" is an issue that
would involve a question of law, in most cases the question is
whether the circumstances of a particular suspect's encounter
with the police come within the definition of "in custody."
87
Another example is whether a person is "domiciled" in a
given state for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction.
8 8
This question naturally turns on a number of historical facts:
Where does the person live? Does she live there full-time? Does
she work there? What is her subjective mental state with respect
85. See e.g. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696-97 (addressing probable cause and reasonable
suspicion); Ludwig v. Pan Ocean Shipping Co., 941 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1991)
(indicating that determination of negligence from established facts is "an exception to the
general rule that mixed questions are reviewed de novo").
86. See e.g. U.S. v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 2003) (whether suspect is in
custody is a mixed question reviewed de novo).
87. See id. at 528-29.
88. See e.g. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing standard of
review for the issue of domicile).
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to where she is domiciled? But the ultimate decision requires
applying these historical facts to the definition of domicile: the
location where the person has established a fixed habitation or
abode and where she intends to remain permanently or
indefinitely. 8
9
I call such issues "questions of definition application"
because they require the decision-maker to determine whether a
particular set of facts falls within a legal definition. As the
domicile example shows, definition application often goes hand
in hand with questions of historical fact. But this is not always
the case. If the historical facts concerning a person's domicile
are undisputed, but a decision still must be made about whether
those facts fall within the legal definition of domicile, the
question involves only definition application.
Questions of definition application are often confused with
questions of legal interpretation,9" for good reason. There is a
fine line between interpreting a statute and asking whether a
statute applies to a certain set of facts. But the two types of
decisions are different, or, rather, there is a species of definition
application that does not involve interpreting the statute. Pure
legal interpretation involves refining a legal definition in a way
that is generally applicable to all like cases. Definition
application involves taking a definition that is already
established and applying it to the facts of a specific case.91
Take, for example, a trial court's decision, under federal
sentencing guidelines, that the defendant's sentence should be
enhanced because the victim was "physically restrained."92 If
the issue on appeal is whether the trial court applied the proper
standard for what constitutes being physically restrained, then
the question involves interpreting the sentencing guidelines, a
legal question. But if there is no dispute about the meaning of
the term, and the only question is whether the facts of the case
89. Id.
90. See infra at Section V(C).
91. Of course, both types of issues might be present in the same case. For example, in
Campbell v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 27 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the issue was
whether a federal employee who ran for public office was an "independent candidate"
within the meaning of the Hatch Act. The court first addressed legal issues raised
concerning what "independent" means. It then considered whether the evidence supported
the inference that the candidate was not "independent." Id. at 1567-69.
92. See e.g. US. v. Stokley, 881 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1989).
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fall within the definition, it is a question of definition
application.93
Questions of definition application arise only where a legal
term cannot be refined to the point where the consequence
follows automatically from the historical facts. Two separate
elements of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress
illustrate this point. In some jurisdictions, negligent infliction
only applies where one person witnesses death or injury to a
closely related person and is also within the "zone of danger"
such that he might himself have been injured.94 The definition of
"closely related person" can be refined to the point where there
is no ambiguity: Courts could hold, for example, that a sibling is
a closely related person, but a friend is not. 5 As to this issue,
there is no need for definition application. Once the jury
determines that the plaintiff was not a sibling of the injured
person, a question of historical fact, the legal consequence
follows automatically. The same cannot be said of "zone of
danger." No matter how many cases attempt to define "zone of
danger," there will always be a need to apply that definition to a
set of facts unless a court was so obsessed with bright line rules
that it required the plaintiff to be within, say, ten feet of the
injured person to be deemed within the zone of danger.
The number of questions involving definition application is
virtually without limit.96 Whenever a rule in common or
statutory law contains a term or phrase that cannot be
mechanically applied based on the historical facts, there is a
question of definition application.
93. The court in Stokley framed the issue as a legal question, although it is not clear that
this is the case. See 881 F.2d at 116.
94. See e.g. Duke v. Cochise County, 938 P.2d 84, 87 (Ariz. App. Div. 2 1996) (noting
also that the person raising the claim must have suffered physical injury resulting from the
shock of seeing the other person injured).
95. See e.g. Hislop v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 5 P.3d
267, 272 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 2000) (plaintiffs could not assert negligent infliction claim for
witnessing injury to friend and co-worker).
96. Following are just a few examples: Prima U.S., Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 223 F.3d
126, 129 (2d Cir. 2000) (whether an entity is a "freight forwarder"); Standard Off Bldg.,
819 F.2d at 1373-74 (whether activities amount to "service in connection with" rail
transportation); Melvin v. Commr., 894 F.2d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1990) (whether a
taxpayer is "at risk"); Hanes v. Okla., 973 P.2d 330, 332 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (whether
a riverbed is in Indian country).
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Questions of definition application are similar to evaluative
determinations in that both require applying a term or standard
to a set of historical facts. But unlike evaluative determinations,
which call on the decision-maker to apply unstated (and
sometimes inarticulable) notions of fairness or reasonableness,
questions of definition application require the decision-maker to
disregard her own notions about what is right and apply the law
as it has been defined. For example, a juror deciding a negligent
infliction of emotional distress case might well think that a
mother who witnessed her son's death from a safe distance is
just as deserving of recovery as one who witnesses it from two
feet away. But she must apply the term "zone of danger" as the
cases have defined it.
Many of the questions courts call mixed are questions of
definition application. 97 But the term suffers from the same
ambiguity in this context as it does with respect to evaluative
determinations. A court might label such a question mixed
because it does not qualify easily as either law or fact, or it
might label the question mixed because it is inextricably
intertwined with other issues.
G. Prescriptive Determinations
Up to this point, we have discussed questions concerning
what happened (historical facts), what will happen (predictive
facts) and what would have happened (also predictive facts), as
well as much different questions concerning how to evaluate or
categorize what happened. The next category consists of
decisions about what should happen.
Prescriptive determinations require the decision-maker to
prescribe some future result. Such questions are often remedial,
such as when a judge crafts an injunction or fixes the terms of a
divorce decree, or when a jury determines the amount of
emotional distress damages the defendant must pay the plaintiff.
They may also be retributive, such as when a jury assesses
punitive damages or a judge sentences a criminal defendant.
97. See e.g. Standard Off Bldg., 819 F.2d at 1374 (indicating that whether a party's
activities constitute service "in connection with" rail transportation is a mixed question);
Campbell v. Merit System, 27 F.3d at 1565 (indicating that whether person was an
"independent candidate" under the Hatch Act considered a mixed question).
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Although always grounded on findings of historical fact,
prescriptive determinations are not themselves empirical.
Anytime the court is being asked to do something rather than to
find something, the issue is prescriptive.
While many damages determinations are prescriptive, not
all are. When the jury determines the amount of an injured
person's medical expenses, it is making a determination of
historical fact as to which the law prescribes the result that the
liable defendant shall pay those damages.98 But when the jury
decides the amount of pain and suffering damages, the question
is prescriptive since it involves only a determination of what the
defendant should pay the plaintiff.
The law concerning who makes what prescriptive
determinations is fairly well established, and consequently,
review of prescriptive determinations generates little
controversy. Judges issue injunctions, and their decisions are
reviewed for abuse of discretion.99 Juries award emotional
distress damages, and their decisions are reviewed
deferentially. 100 One prescriptive determination that has recently
caused controversy, however, is punitive damages. In Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,10 1 a divided
Supreme Court held that the constitutionality of punitive
damages awards would be reviewed de novo. 102
A prescriptive determination can depend on predicate
questions of historical fact, evaluative determinations, or
questions of definition application. For example, a jury deciding
how much to award for pain and suffering must first decide
questions such as whether the plaintiff really hurts as much as
she says, or can still go bowling like she used to. Or a judge
deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction must first
decide whether the applicant will suffer irreparable injury, a
question that is both predictive (will there be injury?) and
evaluative (will the injury be irreparable?).
98. This question of historical fact is usually accompanied by an evaluative
determination concerning whether the medical expenses incurred were reasonable.
99. See e.g. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 2001).
100. See e.g. Adkins v. Asbestos Corp., 18 F.3d 1349, 1351 (6th Cir. 1994).
101. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
102 Id at 440
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H. Questions of Judicial Administration
The next issue-type includes the countless decisions judges
make in the administration of a case. These range from
ministerial matters like whether to grant a trial continuance or
permit a party to exceed the page limit, 10 3 to more meaty
decisions like whether to grant leave to amend or whether to
order a new trial based on juror misconduct. 10 4 The defining
characteristic of questions of judicial administration is that they
involve a balancing of efficiency and fairness considerations.
For this reason, the trial court has substantial discretion over
such matters.
Questions of judicial administration can depend on findings
of historical fact or questions of legal interpretation. For
example, a court deciding whether to grant a new trial for jury
misconduct would first have to determine exactly what the juror
did.10 5 Or a court deciding whether to grant a motion to amend
might have to determine whether the amendment would be futile
because the proposed new claims are legally insufficient. 10 6 Of
course, whether the trial court properly interpreted the law in
making such a discretionary determination is a question oflaw.'107
Evidentiary issues are usually questions of judicial
administration because they involve a balancing of probative
value and prejudice, as well as efficiency considerations. 10 8
103. See e.g. Morris v. Sloppy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (granting of a trial continuance
is within the trial court's discretion); FDIC v. Schreiner, 892 F. Supp. 848, 851 (W.D. Tex.
1995) (extending page limit is within the trial court's discretion).
104. See e.g. Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1218 (10th Cir. 1999) (whether to permit
amendment is reviewed for abuse of discretion); State v. Gabalis, 924 P.2d 534, 539 (Haw.
1996) (whether to grant a new trial for juror misconduct is reviewed for abuse of
discretion).
105. See e.g. Gabalis, 924 P.2d at 540.
106. See e.g. Gohier, 186 F.3d at 1218 (whether amendment would be futile is reviewed
de novo).
107. See e.g. Curtis v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 97, 99 (7th Cir. 1993).
108. See e.g. US. v. Blue Bird, 372 F.3d 989, 991 (8th Cir. 2004) ("Some rules require a
balancing of how particular evidence might affect the jury, and we properly accord
deference to the trial judge on such questions.").
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Again, however, if the evidentiary question turns on the proper
interpretation of a rule, that legal ruling is reviewed de novo.
I. Sufficiency Review
The final category, sufficiency review, requires a sort of
mental gymnastics unique to judicial decision-making. When a
trial court decides a motion for summary judgment or for
judgment as a matter of law, it often must decide whether the
evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to make a particular
finding. The unspoken assumption is that if the jury made a
finding that is not supported by the evidence, it either was acting
irrationally or made its decision based on something other than
the evidence properly considered on that point.
Questions of sufficiency review are made by the trial court
in the first instance and reviewed de novo by appellate courts,
meaning that the appellate court decides the question exactly the
same way the trial court did.1 10 But sufficiency review is itself a
deferential task: The question is whether any reasonable jury
could find for the party opposing the motion.'11 Thus, an
appellate court reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment as
a matter of law technically reviews it de novo, but is engaging in
a deferential exercise, since the underlying question calls for
deference to the trier of fact.
Frequently, a motion for summary judgment or judgment as
a matter of law will raise both questions of sufficiency review
and questions of law. Such motions require the court to engage
in a two-part exercise. First, it makes a ruling on the legal issue.
Then, applying the appropriate legal standard, the court
109. See id ("But a district court's interpretation and application of most rules of
evidence are matters of law.").
110. Branche v. Airtran Airways, Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1252-54 (11 th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1182 (2004). For more on the constitutional limits of sufficiency review
in federal court, see Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), and Hetzel
v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208 (1998).
11. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (holding that a fact
dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the non-
moving party).
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determines whether the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to
find for the non-movant under that standard." 2
Sufficiency review becomes tricky when the underlying
jury issue is an evaluative determination or a question of
definition application. The basic question is the same: Could a
reasonable jury answer the question in favor of the party
opposing the motion? But the distinction between sufficiency
review and a pure question of law starts to blur. When a judge
rules that no reasonable juror could find that the undisputed
historical facts (or the historical facts that reasonably could be
found) meet a certain statutory standard, she is effectively
making a legal determination concerning the meaning of that
standard.11
3
V. UNMIXING THE MIXED QUESTIONS
A. What Is a Mixed Question?
It is admittedly odd to ask what a mixed question is this far
into an article supposedly about mixed questions. But only now
that we have picked apart and sorted through various issue-types
that judges and juries confront are we ready to answer the
question. The vast majority of times when courts call a question
"mixed" they are referring to either: (1) an evaluative
determination, (2) a question of definition application, (3) a pure
question of law involving the interpretation of a legal standard
or (4) a compound question. Each of these so-called "mixed
112. The dual nature of this exercise is reflected in the standard for summary judgment.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (available at http://uscode.house.gov) (summary judgment shall
be granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law).
113. Holmes described this as follows:
The principles of substantive law which have been established by the courts are
believed to have been somewhat obscured by having presented themselves
oftenest in the form of rulings upon the sufficiency of evidence. When a judge
rules that there is no evidence of negligence, he does something more than is
embraced in an ordinary ruling that there is no evidence of fact. He rules that the
acts or omissions proved or in question do not constitute a ground of legal
liability, and in this way the law is gradually enriching itself from daily life, as it
should.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 120-21 (Little, Brown & Co. 1923).
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questions" warrants different treatment on appeal. Each is
discussed below.
But what about "application of law to fact," which is how
many cases and commentators describe mixed questions?" 14 I
prefer to avoid that term because it is ambiguous. Sometimes it
refers to an evaluative determination. 115 Sometimes it refers to a
question of definition application." 6 And sometimes it refers to
a pure question of law involving legal interpretation.' 17 The
ambiguity of the term "law application" only contributes to the
confusion surrounding mixed questions.
B. Evaluative Determinations
As we have seen, evaluative determinations involve the
judging of a person's conduct or belief. This is typically done by
applying a standard like "reasonable" or "fair" that conveys to
the decision-maker that he or she is judging according to a
community standard. 118 What is confusing about evaluative
determinations, however, is that they are sometimes reviewed
deferentially, as in the case of negligence, and sometimes de
novo, as in the case of probable cause. Yet there is no analytical
way to distinguish between these categories. For example, it
cannot be said that negligence is "more factual" than probable
cause or that fact issues are more predominant in deciding
questions of negligence. Negligence is reviewed deferentially
114. See e.g. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n. 19 (1982) (describing
mixed questions as those "in which the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule
of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard, or to
put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not
violated"); Melvin v. Commr., 894 F.2d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The application of the
law to the undisputed facts is reviewed de novo."); Monaghan, supra n. 30, at 234.
115. See e.g. U.S. v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir. 2002) (application of legal
principles surrounding the nature of reasonable suspicion to the facts observed by an
officer is a mixed question reviewed de novo).
116. See e.g. U.S. v. Browne, 318 F.3d 261, 266 (1st Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
901 (2003) (application of the term "obstruction of justice" to the facts of the case is a
mixed question).
117. See e.g. US. v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The questions
presented involve the construction of federal law and its application to essentially
undisputed facts, and therefore they are reviewed de novo.").
118. This often means the community in general, as in a negligence case. Or it can mean
the standard of a more specifically defined community, as in a professional malpractice
case.
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even when the facts are undisputed, and probable cause is
reviewed de novo even when the police evaluated a large
number of facts in determining that they had probable cause.
The rule could have been that all evaluative determinations
are reviewed deferentially, or all reviewed de novo. But that is
not the path our courts have taken. Rather, the Supreme Court's
"policy approach"' 19 prevails: Review of an evaluative
determination is based on a policy choice concerning the judicial
actor better positioned to decide a particular issue. " ° We havt
already seen how this approach plays out with respect to
negligence and probable cause. Now let's look at some other
examples.
In Pierce v. Underwood,'2' the Supreme Court considered
the proper standard of review for a trial court's award of
attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The
relevant provision says that fees shall be awarded "unless the
court finds that the position of the United States was
substantially justified." This is a classic evaluative
determination requiring the trial judge to decide whether the
government's position was justified. To be sure, the trial court
might also have to find facts (e.g., what did the government
know when it took that position?), and might have to decide
what the prevailing law is. But its ultimate decision is whether
the government's position was reasonable to take. The Supreme
Court in Pierce reviewed the reasons why a trial judge or
appellate court might be best equipped to make that particular
judgment, and held that review would be deferential:
We think that the question whether the Government's
litigating position has been "substantially justified" is
precisely such a multifarious and novel question, little
susceptible, for the time being at least, of useful
generalization, and likely to profit from the experience that
an abuse-of-discretion rule will permit to develop.
123
119. See supra at text accompanying nn. 32-39. See also e.g. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S.
104 (1985).
120. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1991).
121. 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
123. 487 U.S. at 562.
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"Reasonable accommodation" under the Americans with
Disabilities Act offers another example. 2 4 In determining
whether an accommodation is reasonable, the court considers,
among other things, its cost and the availability of alternatives.
This makes it an evaluative determination. While some courts
have determined that this decision is best made by the trier of
fact, 125 others conclude that it should be reviewed de novo.
126
The basis for this choice, though courts rarely express it, is a
policy conclusion that the purposes of the ADA are best served
by having the issue decided by one judicial actor (the jury) or
another (the appellate court).
"Fair use" in copyright law is an evaluative determination
that requires application of the four factors set forth in 17 U.S.C.
§ 107,127 which provide guidance, but are themselves subject to
judgment and interpretation. They are: (1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 28 The Supreme
Court has made clear that fair use must be determined based on
the unique circumstances in each case. 129 Nonetheless, that
determination is reviewed de novo. 130 This suggests a policy
choice that judges are better equipped than juries to decide
whether a use is fair.
Happily, most evaluative determinations are recurring.
Thus, once the standard by which they are reviewed is
established, there is no need to undertake a policy analysis each
time the issue comes up. In fact, re-determining the standard of
review on a case-by-case basis would rob standard-of-review
124. See e.g. Pandazides v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1994); Wood v.
Omaha Sch. Dist., 25 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 1994).
125. E.g. Wood, 25 F.3d at 669.
126. E.g. Pandazides, 13 F.3d at 833.
127. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
129. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 578 n. 10.
130. New Era Publications Intl. ApS v. Carol Publg. Group, 904 F.2d 152, 155-56 (2d
Cir. 1990) (characterizing appropriate standard of review as "wide-ranging"); Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003).
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jurisprudence of any semblance of consistence or objectivity.
The only way the policy approach makes sense is if standard of
review is determined on an issue-by-issue basis.
C. Questions of Definition Application, and Distinguishing
Them from Questions of Law
Questions of definition application are similar in that some
are reviewed deferentially and some de novo. But the confusion
concerning these questions usually has more to do with what
question is being asked than with how that question is reviewed.
The critical and first inquiry is whether the issue is a true
question of definition application that involves applying
historical facts to a known legal standard, or a question of law
concerning the interpretation of that standard.
The example we discussed above concerning negligent
infliction of emotional distress illustrates this distinction. 13 1 The
"zone of danger" element is about as refined as it can get, so that
whether a particular person was in the zone of danger is going to
depend on the facts and circumstances of that case. A court
might rule as a matter of law that someone in the next county
can never be within the zone of danger, but there will always be
close calls for the jury to decide. This is a true question of
definition application because it involves applying known facts
to a known standard that cannot be further refined.
Contrast this with the requirement that the plaintiff be
related to the injured person. It is quite possible to draw bright
lines as to this element: e.g., brothers are related, friends are not;
spouses are related (perhaps fianc~s too), but girlfriends and
boyfriends are not. A true question of definition application
likely would not arise with respect to this element. The question
would almost always be one of law.
Let's take some other examples from the case law. In
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,132 the Supreme Court was asked
to review a trial court's determination that an employer's
conduct did not amount to an "abusive work environment"
under Title VII. This typically would be a question of definition
131. See supra at text accompanying nn. 94-95.
132. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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application because it involves applying historical facts (i.e.,
what did the employee's supervisors do?) to the legal standard
of what constitutes an "abusive work environment." But the
question in Harris was not just whether the trial court reached
the right result under an established standard; it was whether the
trial court applied the right standard in the first place.'33 The
Court held that it did not, and therefore reversed. 1
34
Though the Court did not expressly state the standard of
review, its review was clearly de novo. But the Court did not
itself determine whether the work environment in that case was
abusive, as it would have if the underlying question of definition
application were reviewed de novo. Instead, the Court remanded
the case to the trial court.' 35 It did this because, while clarifying
the meaning of "abusive work environment" was a question of
law, deciding whether the proper standard applies on the facts of
the case is for the trier of fact.
36
In the Second Circuit's Panalpina case, 137 the court
reviewed a trial court's determination after a bench trial that a
party was a "freight forwarder" under the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act. "We apply a de novo standard in this case," the court
noted, "because the question whether an entity8 is a freight
forwarder is a mixed question of law and fact.' 3 But there is
nothing mixed about the court's analysis:
Unlike a carrier, a freight forwarder does not issue a bill of
lading, and is therefore not liable to a shipper for anything
that occurs to the goods being shipped.... As long as the
freight forwarder limits its role to arranging for
transportation, it will not be held liable to the shipper....
Panalpina did not issue a bill of lading and it did not
consolidate cargo. It was hired by Westinghouse simply as
a freight forwarder.
139
133. Id. at 21-23.
134. Id. at 23.
135. Id.
136. See Harris v. Parker College of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 794 (5th Cir. 2002)
("Challenges to a district court's finding of hostile work environment and constructive
discharge are typically treated as factual questions, subject to a 'clearly erroneous' standard
of review.").
137. Prima U.S., Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 223 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2000).
138. Id. at 129.
139. Id. (citations omitted).
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This passage involves the purely legal exercise of defining
the term "freight forwarder." Once the court defined the term,
there was no real question that it did not apply.
The issue in Campbell v. Merit Systems Protection
Board140 was whether a federal employee who ran for public
office was an "independent candidate" within the meaning of the
Hatch Act. The employee raised a purely legal issue: whether
her registration as an independent automatically made her
"independent" under the Act. The court held that it did not.
141
Having disposed of the legal issue, the court then held that
whether any particular candidate qualifies as independent is a
case-specific question on which it will defer to the trier of
fact.14 This latter issue is a question of definition application.
A final example is Standard Office Building Corp. v.
US.,143 which concerned whether, for tax purposes, a company
performed services "in connection with" rail transportation. That
question, the court noted, "is the kind of 'mixed' question of fact
and law (really, the application of a legal standard to facts) that,
in this circuit at least, is governed by the clearly-erroneous
standard.'144 It thus characterized the issue as one of definition
application. Having done that, however, the court proceeded to
review the issue de novo on the ground that the parties had all
asked the court to do so, and therefore waived their right to jury
trial on the issue.
145
From these cases, it is apparent that the most important task
in reviewing a question of definition application is to ask what is
being asked. Is the issue whether to adopt a rule of law that will
refine the definition in a way generally applicable to other
cases? Or is it simply whether the facts of a particular case fall
within the definition? If the former, it is a pure question of law
and calling it "mixed" simply confuses the issue.
140. 27 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
141. Id. at 1568.
142. Id at 1567 ("[W]e hold that the mixed question of 'independent candidate' must be
placed in the category of fact for purposes ofjudicial review.").
143. 819 F.2d 1371 (7th Cir. 1987).
144. Id. at 1374.
145. Id. The idea that the parties can change the standard of review by stipulation (or
waiver) is a strange one. Waiver of a jury trial typically means that the trial judge resolves
the issue; it does not necessarily mean that the appellate court reviews that resolution de
novo.
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If the issue is a true question of definition application, the
court then must decide how that issue is reviewed. In this
respect, questions of definition application are like evaluative
determinations; the standard of review depends on a policy
choice concerning which judicial actor is best equipped to
decide the issue. The D.C. Circuit has suggested that the "mine
run of mixed questions" should be reviewed deferentially, and
this makes sense for questions of definition application. The
Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion, noting that such
questions are reviewed for clear error "except in those few,
mainly constitutional cases in which the Supreme Court hasdecreed plenary review.''147 This is both because case-specific
questions of definition application are unlikely to recur, thus not
implicating appellate courts' role in ensuring the law's
uniformity and consistency, 148 and because "the court that finds
the facts will know them better than the reviewing court will,
and so its application of the law to the facts is likely to be more
accurate."149
This approach is sound. Only in the rare case, where strong
countervailing policy considerations exist, should a question of
definition application be reviewed de novo. More critically, the
standard of review should, as with evaluative determinations, be
made on an issue-by-issue basis, rather than case by case.
One final issue needs to be addressed in connection with
questions of definition application, and that is the relationship
among that type of issue, pure questions of law, and sufficiency
review. Where a trial court (or jury) has resolved a question of
definition application and the issue is whether the evidence is
sufficient to support that resolution, the line between sufficiency
review and a question of law is thin. To illustrate, take the
question of whether a company has performed services "in
connection with" railroad transportation, which is a question for
146. Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
147. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 2002).
148. Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Campbell v. Merit Sys.
Protection Board, 27 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[M]ost of the Hatch Act cases
will be sui generis, presenting unique combinations of numerous specific episodes....
Such case-specificity severely limits the scope of any one decision's precedential
relevance.").
149. Thomas, 288 F.3d at 307-08.
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the trier of fact. 150 Assuming the facts are undisputed (or
construing the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the
trial court's resolution), the appellate court's task is to decide
whether a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the
company's services were "in connection with" railroad
transportation. In making that determination, however, the
appellate court will rule that certain historical facts do or do not
satisfy the "in connection with" standard as a matter of law.
Should another similar case come along, that decision (assuming
it is published) will have precedential value. In engaging in
sufficiency review of a question of definition application, the
court has created law.
D. Compound Questions
Evaluative determinations and questions of definition
application are mixed in the same sense: They are single issues
that are neither questions of historical fact nor questions of law.
Compound questions, however, are completely different. They
are mixed because they consist of multiple sub-issues which
may be questions of law, fact, or otherwise.
The simplest example is in a negligence case when the jury
must determine both what happened and whether, in light of the
facts it found, the defendant exercised reasonable care. Since
both questions are reviewed deferentially, the compound nature
of this question never causes any difficulty. 151 The same cannot
be said about probable cause, which is reviewed de novo, but
which is based on historical facts that should be reviewed with
deference. 152 As to this issue, it is critically important to separate
the evaluative determination from the underlying historical facts.
The problem with labeling a compound question "mixed" is
that there is a tendency to slap on a single label-"this court
reviews mixed questions de novo"-and then proceed to review
150. Standard Off Bldg. Corp., 819 F.2d at 1373-74.
151. See Holmes, supra n. 113, at 129: "The trouble with many cases of negligence is,
that they are of a kind not frequently recurring, so as to enable any given judge to profit by
long experience with juries to lay down rules, and that the elements are so complex that
courts are glad to leave the whole matter in a lump for the jury's determination."
152. See e.g. U.S. v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11 th Cir. 2003) (when reviewing a
motion to suppress, the court reviews findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard
and the determination of probable cause de novo).
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the entire case according to that standard even if there are
various sub-issues subject to a different standard of review. The
following quotation illustrates this mistake:
Most of the trial court's findings are mixed questions of
law and fact or are legal conclusions which we are free to
evaluate unrestricted by the rule compelling us to construe
the evidence most favorably to support the judgment....
[I]f the facts are undisputed, we may ignore the trial court's
findings and substitute our own analysis of the record. This
principle applies whether the record consists of pleadings,
documents, affidavits and stipulations.... or the testimony
of parties and witnesses.
153
The suggestion that labeling a question mixed eliminates
the need to defer to the trial court's findings is wrong. Just
because the question before the court involves some legal
questions does not mean the standard of review changes as to
issues that would otherwise be reviewed deferentially.
This problem usually arises because the various sub-issues
that make up the compound question are not separated from one
another. Take, for example, a copyright case in which the trial
court held that the defendant's use of copyrighted material did
not constitute "fair use," but did not make any express findings
of historical fact to support that determination. Fair use is an
evaluative determination reviewed de novo, 154  but the
underlying findings of fact are reviewed deferentially. Assuming
that the evidence was conflicting-that is, the parties disputed
the manner in which the defendant was using copyrighted
material-how would an appellate court review the
determination?
The court could review the determination of fair use de
novo while viewing the historical facts in a light most favorable
to sustaining the ruling and assuming that the trial court found
all historical facts necessary to its decision. 155 Alternatively, the
153. Tovrea Land & Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 412 P.2d 47, 51 (Ariz. 1966) (citations
omitted); see also e.g. Phillips v. Fox, 458 S.E.2d 327, 332 (W. Va. 1995) ("[W]e review
the trial court's findings of fact following a bench trial, including mixed fact/law findings,
under the clearly erroneous standard. If the trial court makes no findings.., no deference
attaches to such an application.").
154. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811,817 (9th Cir. 2003).
155. See e.g. U.S. v. Ins. Consultants of Knox, Inc., 187 F.3d 755, 759 (7th Cir. 1999)
("Whether enforcement of the summons would violate Miller's Fifth Amendment privilege
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court could hold that the trial court erred by failing to make
explicit findings of historical fact and remand the case so that
the trial court could make those findings. 156 The latter route
would essentially be a legal ruling that, as to that issue, express
findings of historical fact are required in order to permit
adequate de novo review of the fair use determination.17 What
the court should not do is review the entire fair use question de
novo, historical facts and all, simply because the trial court did
not adequately separate the sub-issues from one another.
To illustrate, let's take the Tovrea Land and Cattle case,'
which is quoted above. 159 After a bench trial, the trial court
issued findings and conclusions in which it ruled that directors
of a corporation breached their fiduciary duties by utilizing
corporate opportunities for their own benefit. Finding the issues
on appeal to be "mixed," the appellate court felt free to review
the whole thing de novo. 1  It then engaged in an extensive
review of the facts and reached its own conclusion-contrary to
the trial court's finding-that the directors did not improperly
compete with the corporation.161 By characterizing thedispositive question as mixed, the court was able to
against compelled self-incrimination is a mixed question of law and fact.... We review
the district court's factual findings for clear error and the application of law to those facts
de novo.") (citation omitted); Josey v. State, 981 S.W.2d 831, 837 (Tex. App., 14th Dist.
1998) ("If the trial court does not file findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate
court presumes the trial court made findings necessary to support its ruling so long as those
implied findings are supported by the record.").
156. See e.g. U.S. v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1401-02 (5th Cir. 1991) (when reviewing
evidentiary decision under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), court may make a limited
remand to allow trial court to make express findings in support of its ruling); Cadle Co. v.
McKernan, 207 B.R. 971, 974-75 (D. Mass. 1997) ("[I]f the record does not disclose the
reasoned basis for the [discretionary] sanction, this court may remand for a statement of
reasons sufficient to enable this court to review the decision under the applicable standard
of review.").
157. See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (available at http://uscode.house.gov). Some, but not
all, determinations by a trial court require findings of fact to be express. See e.g. Frame v.
S-H, Inc., 967 F.2d 194, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1992); Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Hyundai Elec.
Indus. Co., 50 F. Supp. 2d 619, 622 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
158. 412 P.2d47 (Ariz. 1966).
159. See text accompanying n. 153.
160. Tovrea Land & Cattle Co., 412 P.2d at 51.
161. Id. at 52-59.
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talismanically cite the rule that mixed questions are reviewed de
novo and so avoid any deferential review.
162
What the court should have done was parse the larger
issue-Did the directors seize business opportunities of the
corporation for their own benefit?-into its component sub-
issues. The first sub-issue would involve historical facts, i.e.,
what was the trial court's finding about what the directors did?
Assuming that the evidence was conflicting, the court would
have to resolve all other issues while viewing the historical facts
in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling.
Second, the court might have to make a legal determination of
what it takes to prove that a director improperly seized a
corporate opportunity. In this case, it held that "[t]he 'business
opportunity' doctrine holds that a director or officer may not
seize for himself, to the detriment of his company, business
opportunities in the company's line of activities in which it has
an interest or prior claim."'163 The court might also ask whether
the case involved any questions about what terms like
"detriment of the company" or "business opportunities" mean,
which would be legal issues. Finally, assuming that those terms
are as defined as they can get, the court would ask whether their
application to the facts of the case-a question of definition
application-is something that the trial court or the appellate
court is better positioned to do.
This seems like a cumbersome exercise, but it need not be.
Assuming that the application of "business opportunities" is
reviewed deferentially, the court would simply ask whether the
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to sustaining the
judgment, supports the trial court's determination that a certain
transaction amounted to a business opportunity. Or if the court
ruled that the application of that term is reviewed de novo, it
would determine itself whether the facts showed a business
opportunity, again viewing the facts in a light most favorable to
sustaining the judgment. What the court should not do is use the
"mixed question" label as a justification for de novo review of
what would otherwise be questions for the trier of fact.
162. It may be that the court just found the evidence in the record insufficient to justify
the trial court's findings. But its analysis and citation of the standard of review suggests the
court was not deferring to the trial court's findings.
163. Id. at 57 (citation omitted).
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The Seventh Circuit case of Maynard v. Nygren
164
illustrates the proper handling of a compound question. The
issue there was whether the trial court properly dismissed a
lawsuit as a discovery sanction. The court noted that discovery
sanctions are typically reviewed for abuse of discretion, which
makes the issue (to use the vocabulary of this article) a question
of judicial administration.' 65 But the court went on to note that
the trial court's factual findings-what the party did to warrant
sanctions-are reviewed for clear error, while plenary review is
warranted to the extent that the court made a legal error in
applying its discretion. 16 6 Holding that the trial court applied the
wrong legal standard in entering discovery sanctions, the court
remanded for a re-determination under the proper standard.
167
Had the court held that the trial court utilized the correct
standard, it would have reviewed the trial court's decision for
abuse of discretion, viewing the historical facts in a light most
favorable to sustaining the decision.
When, as in Maynard, the court holds that the trial court's
ruling was "tainted" or "infected" by legal error, 168 it means (1)
that the trial court made a decision on a question that usually
would be reviewed deferentially-possibly an evaluative
determination, a question of definition application, a prescriptive
determination, or a question of judicial administration-and (2)
that it is apparent from the record that the trial court applied an
erroneous legal principle in making that decision. 69 Courts
occasionally suggest that, when the trial court makes factual
findings under an erroneous view of the law, the appellate court
can review the whole thing de novo. 170 Again, this is wrong. The
proper remedy is to reverse, issue an opinion that enunciates the
164. 332 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, _ U.S. , 125 S. Ct. 865 (2005).
165. See supra at Section IV(H).
166. Maynard, 332 F.3d at 468.
167. Id at 469.
168. Id. at 468; see also e.g. Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 380 (7th
Cir. 1996) (court reviews the trial court's findings and conclusions for signs that its
application of the law was infected with legal error).
169. Maynard, 332 F.3d at 468.
170. See e.g. In re Auclair, 961 F.2d 65, 69 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Factual findings made
under an erroneous view of the law are not binding on the appellate court."); Valley
Improvement Assn., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Corp., 129 F.3d 1108, 1123 (10th Cir.
1997) ("The reviewing court is not bound by the clearly erroneous standard when the trial
court has based its findings on an erroneous view of the law.") (citations omitted).
ALL MIXED UP ABOUT MIXED QUESTIONS
correct legal standard, and remand to the trial court to make a
new determination in light of the correction. 
171
VI. SPECIAL PROBLEMS
A. Terms That Confuse: Inferences, Ultimate Facts,
and Conclusions
By now, it should be clear that the term "mixed question"
often serves more to confuse than to clarify. 172 There are other
terms as well that cause confusion when used in connection with
mixed questions. One such term is "inference," which is
sometimes used to describe an evaluative determination or
question of definition application. 173 For example, in a
negligence case, the court might distinguish between the jury's
findings of historical fact (e.g., the driver was exceeding the
speed limit and changed lanes twice) and the "inference," based
on those facts, that the driver was negligent.
The term "inference" should be avoided in this context
because it confuses what is clearly an evaluative determination
with another use of the term. Inference more properly refers to
the finding of a historical fact based on circumstantial evidence.
To use our automobile accident example, the jury might have
evidence of skid marks and automobile damage and from that
evidence draw an inference that the driver exceeded the speed
limit. This is different from the evaluative determination-
171. See e.g. Himes v. Safeway Ins. Co., 66 P.3d 74, 84 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 2003) (where
trial court applied the wrong legal standard, remand for new findings was necessary). This
is true unless the court of appeals determines that, under a correct interpretation of law, the
evidence would not support the trial court's determination. See e.g. Dorr-Oliver, 94 F.3d at
384. Ironically, when express findings are not required, the trial court best insulates itself
from appellate review by saying as little as possible, because the appellate court will
presume that it made all reasonable findings necessary to its disposition. If the trial court
makes express findings and conclusions, but is not required to, a clearly erroneous finding
or an incorrect conclusion of law will be cause for reversal.
172. See ASCAP v. Showtime/Movie Channel, Inc., 912 F.2d 562, 569 n. 11 (2d Cir.
1990) (noting that the phrase mixed question "does not aid in identifying the appropriate
standard of appellate review").
173. See e.g. Suzy's Zoo v. Commr., 273 F.3d 875, 878 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The Tax
Court's finding that Appellant is a 'producer' under I.R.C. § 263A is an ultimate inference
from undisputed facts and is thus a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo.").
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which might also be called an "inference"-that the driver's
excessive speed breached the duty of due care.
The term "conclusion" is sometimes used in the same way.
For example:
None of the underlying facts in this case are in dispute.
Rather, the parties' dispute relates to the conclusion that
should be drawn from the underlying facts-"whether the
facts satisfy the statutory standard" for self-employment
tax.... This is a mixed question of law and fact,
reviewable de novo.1
74
In this quote, "conclusion" refers to a question of definition
application. But that term is ambiguous as well. It can mean the
conclusion a jury reaches when it finds historical facts. Or it can
mean the conclusion a court reaches when, applying principles
of statutory construction, it decides the proper interpretation of a
statute. This term, too, should be avoided.
Also confusing is the term "ultimate fact," which is
sometimes used to refer to an evaluative determination that is
dispositive in the case. For example:
The final logical step in the adjudicative decisional process
is found in the application of the relevant general legal
principles to the historical facts found. This process
produces findings of ultimate fact, such as the
determinations that defendant's employee was negligent
and was acting within the scope of his or her employment.
Ultimate facts, because they combine elements of law and
fact, do not fit nicely within the law/fact dichotomy. 1
75
The problem with using "ultimate fact" in this sense is that
it is not the ultimate quality' of the issue that dictates the standard
of review, but its nature. An evaluative determination may
174. Milligan v. Commr., 38 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
175. Louis, supra n. 13, at 994 (footnote omitted); see also e.g. Weaver v. Shadoan, 340
F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir. 2003) ("A district court's findings of ultimate facts, based upon the
application of legal principles to subsidiary facts, are also subject to de novo review.")
(citation omitted); Colo. St. Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Major, 996 P.2d 246, 248 (Colo.
App. Div. 2 1999) ("Ultimate facts are 'conclusions of law or mixed questions of law and
fact that are based on evidentiary facts and determine the rights and liabilities of the
parties.' As a general rule, ultimate facts are phrased in the language of the controlling
statute or legal standard.") (citation omitted).
176. See e.g. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) (an issue does not lose its
factual character merely because it is the ultimate constitutional issue). The Miller Court
cites Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534 (1979), for the proposition that
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well be the ultimate issue in a case, as it is in negligence cases.
But there are evaluative determinations that are not ultimate, like
reasonable reliance in a fraud case. And there are ultimate issues
that are not evaluative, such as intent to discriminate in an equal
protection case. 177 Even a question of historical fact may be the
ultimate issue in a case if that fact is dispositive.
B. Constitutional Facts
Much has been written about "constitutional facts," or
those issues that normally would be reviewed deferentially but
which, because of their constitutional implications, are reviewed
de novo. 178 There is no need to repeat that discussion here
except to point out how constitutional facts fit into the
framework set forth in this article. When we look at so-called
questions of constitutional fact we see that they are, for the most
part, either evaluative determinations or questions of definition
application. As discussed above, these issue-types are
sometimes reviewed deferentially, sometimes de novo.
Questions of constitutional fact are just evaluative
determinations or questions of definition application that the
Supreme Court has decided, for reasons of constitutional policy,
should be reviewed de novo.
This explains probable cause and reasonable suspicion,
which the Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S. 1 7 9 to be
questions for the court. The Court pointed out that probable
cause and reasonable suspicion cannot be reduced to a neat set
of rules, but rather "are fluid concepts that take their substantive
content from the particular contexts in which the standards are
being assessed."' This makes them evaluative determinations,
very much like reasonable care in a negligence case. But unlike
negligence, probable cause and reasonable suspicion are
constitutional terms that define the scope of a suspect's Fourth
intent to discriminate-clearly a question of historical fact-is reviewed deferentially even
though it is the ultimate issue in an equal protection claim.
177. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977).
178. For more detailed discussions of constitutional facts, see, for example, Monaghan,
supra n. 30, and Louis, supra n. 13, at 1029-32.
179. 517 U.S. 690, 691 (1996).
180. Id. at 696 (citations omitted).
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Amendment rights. "Independent review," the court concluded,
"is therefore necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control
of, and to clarify, the legal principles."' 8 1 It is also necessary to
ensure, as much as possible, uniformity of application.' 8  In
other words, if juries decided probable cause and reasonable
suspicion, then the extent of one's constitutional rights could
vary according to the whims of any given group of twelve
citizens.
Obscenity offers another example. In Jacobellis v. Ohio,
183
the Supreme Court held that courts must review de novo
whether materials are "obscene" and so exempt from First
Amendment protection. 184 The case is less famous for that
holding, however, than for Justice Stewart's "I know it when I
see it" description of obscenity:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of
material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand
description; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the
motion picture involved in this case is not that.
1 85
So described, obscenity is a question of definition
application. It is a term that cannot be defined with perfect
specificity, but must be applied case by case. Such a question
would normally be for the jury. 186 But just like probable cause,
the need to ensure uniform application of constitutional rights
justified making the question one for the court. 87
These cases make perfect sense. They stand for the
unremarkable proposition that certain evaluative determinations
and questions of definition application are, due to their
constitutional dimension, better left to judges than juries.'88 But
181. Id. at 697 (citation omitted).
182. Id. at 697-98.
183. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
184. Id. at 190.
185. Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
186. This is exactly what Chief Justice Warren thought. See id. at 199-203 (Warren, C.J,
& Clark, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 190.
188. Miller v. Fenton, which holds that the voluntariness of a confession is reviewed de
novo, is in accord. 474 U.S. at 109-11. While voluntariness might seem to be a question of
historical fact involving the defendant's mental state (i.e., whether the defendant
knowingly agreed to incriminate himself), the Court interpreted the provision to include
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the Court went a giant step further when, in Bose Corporation v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc.," 9 it held that "actual
malice" in a defamation case must be reviewed de novo. Actual
malice means knowledge that the defamatory statement was
false or that it was made with a reckless disregard for its truth.' 90
As such, it clearly involves a question of historical fact
concerning the defendant's subjective mental state. The Court
acknowledged as much in Bose: "It surely does not stretch the
language of the Rule to characterize an inquiry into what a
person knew at a given point in time as a question of 'fact.""
9 1
Nonetheless, the Court deemed the constitutional importance of
that finding-"this Court's role in marking out the limits of the
standard through the process of case-by-case adjudication"-
sufficient to justify de novo review.1 92
Recently, in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 93 the Court toed this line again. It held that a
finding of whether a punitive damages award is sufficiently
excessive or disproportional as to violate due process is
reviewed de novo. r94 While Cooper Industries might be
criticized on the ground that it, like Bose, authorizes de novo
review of a question of fact, there are two critical differences
between the cases. First, whether a person knew that his
statement was false (the actual malice question in Bose) is a
question of historical fact, whereas the amount of punitive
damages to award is a prescriptive determination, albeit one
traditionally given to juries. 195 Second, Cooper Industries does
not require punitive damages to be fixed by courts of appeal de
novo; it only holds that the constitutional issue of excessiveness
more than that simple question. "Although sometimes framed as an issue of 'psychological
fact,"' the Court wrote, "the dispositive question of the voluntariness of a confession has
always had a uniquely legal dimension." Id. at 115-16. So defined, "voluntariness" is an
evaluative determination.
189. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
190. N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
191. Bose, 466 U.S. at 498 (footnote omitted).
192. Id. at 503. This is not true of all questions of historical fact that have constitutional
significance. For example, the question of intent to discriminate-the key question in equal
protection cases-is reviewed deferentially. Brinkman, 443 U.S. at 534.
193. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
194. Id. at 440.
195. Id. at 437.
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is reviewed de novo. 19 6 This proportionality review is not a true
de novo review, but rather a sort of stepped-up sufficiency
review.
C. Contract Interpretation
Another trouble area is contract interpretation. It is often
said that interpreting a contract is a question of law, or at least a
mixed question, that appellate courts review de novo.
197
Construing contracts often involves interpreting legal terms and
phrases that were crafted by lawyers to have a specific legal
effect. It therefore makes sense that judges trained in the law
would be better equipped to interpret them than lay jurors. This
is especially true for standardized contracts like insurance
policies or technical contract provisions like indemnity
clauses.' 98 There is also a strain in the case law suggesting that
contracts are "private law"'199 because, like statutes, they set
forth rules to govern particular circumstances. The difference, of
course, is that contractually established rules apply only to those
who agree upon them, unlike statutes, which are agreed to by a
limited group of people (legislators) and applicable to the
general public.
But there is an opposing strain of authority holding that the
jury determines what the parties intended.20 0 There is sense to
this view as well because the critical issue in any question of
contract interpretation is what the parties agreed to and what
they intended their words to mean. These are clearly questions
196. Id. at 441-43.
197. See e.g. APC Operating Parin. v. Mackey, 841 F.2d 1031, 1033 (10th Cir. 1988)
(noting that the construction of a contract is ordinarily a question of law for the court).
198. See e.g. Smith v. Tenneco Oil Co., 803 F.2d 1386, 1388 (5th Cir. 1986)
(interpreting indemnity provisions is a matter for the court); Galindo v. ARI Mut. Ins. Co.,
203 F.3d 771, 774 (11 th Cir. 2000) (interpretation of insurance contract is a question of law
reviewed de novo).
199. See e.g. Barrera v. Ciolino, 636 So. 2d 218, 222 n. 15 (La. 1994) (citing a statutory
comment that refers to contracts as "the private law of the parties").
200. See e.g. Einhorn v. Fleming Foods of Pa., Inc., 258 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that where contract is ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact).
201. See e.g. Antilles S.S. Co. v. Members of Am. Hull Ins. Syndicate, 733 F.2d 195, 199
(2d Cir. 1984) (in insurance dispute, the dispositive issue was the parties' mutual
understanding); Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1138 (Ariz.
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of historical fact. They are also the sort of questions juries are
best qualified to answer because they involve listening to
testimony, reviewing evidence, and determining whose version
of reality is true.
202
How do we reconcile these two conflicting rules? Some
cases hold that contract interpretation is a question for the jury
when the contract is ambiguous, but a question for the court
when the contract is unambiguous. 20 3 Other cases similarly hold
that contract interpretation is a question of law unless the
question turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence. 20 4 This is
a strange rule, since the need for contract interpretation almost
inherently suggests ambiguity. The rule may simply mean,
however, that where a court determines the contract to be
unambiguous-that is, where it only has one reasonable
interpretation-it can enforce that interpretation without
submitting the question to the jury or considering extrinsic
evidence.
One problem with this approach is that does not account for
many questions of contract interpretation that involve
ambiguous provisions but which are nonetheless for the court to
interpret. For example, in a dispute over the meaning of
language in an insurance policy, the language may well be
ambiguous-that is, reasonably susceptible of more than one
meaning-but the question is nonetheless one for the court.
205
This approach also does not account for disputes over the
meaning of contracts as to which there is no extrinsic evidence,
but which still require a jury to decide what the parties intended.
Other cases suggest that contract "interpretation" is a
question for the jury, while contract "construction," which
1993) (the main purpose of contract interpretation is to discover and effect the parties'
intent).
202. See e.g. U.S. v. McCall, 235 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2000) (issue of contract
formation "turned primarily on factual determinations regarding the history of the parties'
settlement negotiations, their intent, and the nature and amount of settlement offer
ultimately intended").
203. Stinnett v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 227 F.3d 247, 254 (5th Cir. 2000).
204. See e.g. Thor Seafood Corp. v. Supply Mgt. Servs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131
(C.D. Cal. 2005); Murray v. Puls, 690 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Minn. App. 2004), review denied
(2005).
205. See e.g. Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weathermark Invs., Inc., 292 F.3d 77, 80 (1st Cir.
2002).
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involves the legal operation of words, is for the court. 2 0 6 The
latter includes determining what effect an agreement will have
on circumstances the parties did not foresee. 07 This, too, is an
odd rule. It assumes there is a distinction between the meaning
and a contract and its effect, but what effect could a contract
have other than that the parties meant it to have? Moreover,
what is it about the effect of a contract-even a contract that did
not contemplate certain circumstances-that makes judicial
interpretation appropriate?
An alternative to both these approaches might be to
determine on a case-by-case basis whether an issue of contract
interpretation is more fact-like or more law-like. If the issue
turns on the construction of legal terms or standard contract
provisions, it is decided by the court and reviewed de novo. If it
turns on a question of what the parties intended or agreed to, it is
a question for the jury and reviewed deferentially. This solution
is unsatisfactory, however, because its consequence is results-
oriented decision-making. An appeals court that thinks the
appellant is in the right need only find the issue more law-like,
and therefore review it de novo. Or a court that preferred the
appellee's view could hide behind deferential review simply by
finding that the issue turns more on what the parties intended.
Another approach is to let the jury have the first crack at
the issue by asking whether the parties had any specific intent
with respect to a disputed provision. If they did, then that intent
would be enforced. Only if the jury found that the parties did not
have any specific intent would the court have to undertake the
task of interpreting the provision. The problem with this
approach, however, is that there are many provisions that are
negotiated and as to which the parties had a specific intent, but
which are probably best interpreted by a court. In a construction
contract, for example, the parties may have specifically
negotiated indemnity language, but they probably did so with an
eye on the case law and with the expectation that a judge rather
than a jury would be the one interpreting the provision should
the relationship go south.
206. Ram Constr. Co., Inc. v. Am. Sts. Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1049, 1052-53 (3d Cir. 1984).
207. Id. at 1053 (citing Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, vol. 3, § 534 (West
1950)).
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From this brief discussion, it is clear that the unique
problem of how to treat questions of contract interpretation on
appeal is complex enough that trying to tackle it here would take
us very far afield. This thorny problem will have to be deferred
to another day.
VII. CONCLUSION-A METHODOLOGY FOR MIXED QUESTIONS
At the start of this article, I quoted the Court of Claims's
description of mixed questions as "elusive abominations." By
properly recognizing and parsing the issues on appeal, however,
the questions we are accustomed to giving the ambiguous label
"mixed" can become less elusive, though one might cynically
suggest that having to go through this exercise just to determine
the standard of review makes mixed questions even more
abominable than before.
The first step is to recognize whether the mixed question is
a single issue or a compound question. If it is compound, then
the issue needs to be separated into its sub-issues and each sub-
issue needs to be reviewed under the appropriate standard. Any
issue that is reviewed deferentially, but which the trial court did
not expressly decide, will be deemed resolved in a manner
supporting the lower court's disposition, unless the law requires
the finding to be express, in which case a remand is appropriate.
Only if there is no already-established standard of review for an
issue-if, for example, it is an evaluative determination or a
question of definition application as to which there is no prior
decision--does the court need to engage in a policy analysis to
determine the standard of review for that issue.
This exercise seems pretty cumbersome, I admit, but the
cases in which a court will have to go through the whole
rigmarole will be rare. Most standard-of-review questions are
straightforward, and a little clear thinking about what the issues
on appeal really are will go a long way. But when the court does
need to go through this exercise, the complexity it adds is
preferable to the confusion-the "lack of clarity and
coherence"--that otherwise would ensue.

